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# **THE PRESIDENCY.**

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The following Essays were addressed to the "*Baltimore Chronicle*," and published in that paper.—  
Their aim is a concentration of the whole opposition to General Jackson—if they shall have a tendency to produce such a result,—the purposes will be accomplished of

AN OLD MAN.



## THE PRESIDENCY.

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TO THE EDITORS OF THE CHRONICLE.

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GENTLEMEN—Your article under this head in your paper of this morning gives me unfeigned delight, by its calmness, its decorum and its dignity. This is a time for conciliation, mutual good feeling and union, and no good can result from our treating either of the gentlemen who are before the public, rudely or disrespectfully. They are all worthy of respect, and insult either to them, or to their respective friends, can have no other tendency than to exasperation and disunion, while it is admitted on all hands that harmony and union are indispensable to our common object.

But while I am altogether gratified by the tone of your article, I do not entirely agree with you in your mode of considering the subject. I am a Clay man—By which I mean that I should prefer the election of Mr. Clay to any other. But I am not a Clay man to the extent of preferring him to the cause of my country. I am for supporting him in preference to all others if we can make him the common rallying point of the whole opposition ; for you admit, as we all admit, that a union of the whole opposition is necessary to defeat the re-election of General Jackson. But if we cannot make Mr. Clay this common rallying point, and can make another man so, of unexceptionable politics and character, then I am for support-

ing that other man. Although from my attachment to Mr. Clay, it would be almost as painful to me to give him up as to lose a limb, yet I would rather bear the amputation than lose the life of the cause.

I agree with you perfectly in the sentiment that “a pertinacious adherence to a man ought not to be considered as paramount to our duty to our country.”—But I apply the sentiment fairly and impartially to all sides. When I say to the other parties that *all personal predilection* ought to be given up to advance the common object, I mean what I say in its fullest extent. I have no mental reservations in favor of Mr. Clay or any other individual. I do not call upon the other members of the opposition to do what I am unwilling to do myself, for this would be disingenuous and unjust ; and acting upon this principle in perfect candor and integrity, I, for one, am ready to give up Mr. Clay, however painful the sacrifice, if I can be convinced that the paramount object of uniting the opposition demand the surrender.

And I am ready, as we all ought to be, to consider this question not through the medium of our prejudices, but by that impartial light of reason to which all the members of the opposition ought willingly to bow.

The question then is, on which of these candidates is it most probable and practicable to unite the whole opposition ? The Question is not on which of them we of the Clay party think that they ought to unite, but on which of them it is most practicable to bring them to unite—for we wish to gain the end, and it is not for us alone to choose the means. The other members of the opposition are also to be consulted ; and they must be consulted if we wish to accomplish

the common object ; because we admit that we cannot succeed without them—and it will be utterly idle and unavailing in us to accuse them of obstinacy ; they will retort the accusation, and the affair will end in a quarrel instead of ending in union.

Let us consider this matter coolly and wisely before the breach becomes irreparable ; and let us bring about this union by any sacrifice of feeling, if it be practicable to bring it about.

How stands the argument? You say that the other members of the opposition ought to unite on Mr. Clay because he has the strongest party.

They answer, 1. You may be the strongest part of the opposition, considering the parts separately, but are you stronger than all the rest of the opposition united? and when you have made the proper deductions from our electioneering estimate of Mr. Clay's strength, I fear the candid answer must be against us.

2. They answer that if it were conceded that you are stronger than all the rest of the opposition combined, you admit that you cannot succeed without us, and though we were as much weaker than you, as the State of Vermont is weaker than the State of New York, yet we are integral members of the opposition, and cannot be reasonably and fairly expected to bow to your dictation—we are willing to meet on middle ground, but not willing to surrender the whole of our rights.

3. With regard to Mr. Clay, they say, we have an insuperable antipathy to that choice. With your predilection for him we know that you consider this both unreasonable and offensive. But we have as much right to our opinions as you have to yours—take some

other man of your own party, who shall be perfectly unexceptionable to yourselves, and we are willing to unite upon him—why do you hesitate, except upon the very principle which you disavow, that the cause is to be sacrificed to the man whom you call your “first love.”

I do not know how you may consider this subject, but I confess that the argument seems to me to be against us.

I am an old man, and look upon this matter coolly and dispassionately. My wish is to see that union of the whole opposition effected, on which we all admit that our success depends—I do not ask myself, therefore on whom the opposition ought to be united, but on whom can it be united? I do not ask myself which of the candidates is the strongest man, now, but which of them can we make the strongest man by uniting upon him? And the only remaining question is, on which of these candidates is it most practicable to bring all the members of the opposition to unite.

1. Will the Anti-Masons unite on Mr. Clay? I say will they; not, ought they? We must deal with men as they are, and not as we wish them to be. Will they unite on Mr. Clay? It is in vain to delude ourselves with idle hopes, we know that they will not; and we know also that without their aid, Mr. Clay cannot carry New York or Pennsylvania, to say nothing of the New England States.

2. Will the Anti-Tariff States, including all the States to the South of the Potomac, unite upon Mr. Clay? We know that they will not.

3. Will the elements of General Jackson's party

now dissolving, or preparing to dissolve, unite on Mr. Clay? We know that they will not, but on the contrary, if Mr. Clay be the only alternative offered to them, instead of falling off, as they are ready to do, they will be cemented more closely to their present leader, and thus increase his strength and weaken the opposition.

However painful these conclusions must be, can we deny them? Do they not stare us in the face, and do we not in our secret bosoms all admit them? What wisdom is there then in denying them, or masking them from the people? It would be politic I admit, if with the loss of Mr. Clay I could see that we were to lose the great object which we had in view. But this I do not see; for I think it depends entirely on the course to be taken by the National Republican party whether we are to lose our cause or not. And since the other members of the opposition will not unite on the man of our choice, let us see if we cannot still find a man in our own ranks—upon whom we can unite with them; without endangering our political principles.

If the mountain will not come to Mahomet, let us see if Mahomet cannot save his cause by going to the mountain.

For the present I have trespassed upon you long enough. I know that those who see nothing in the case but Mr. Clay, will consider this as a very cold-blooded speculation. But I have lived long enough to look from men to the country, for I am

AN OLD MAN.

*Balt., Oct. 27, 1831.*

## LETTER II.

GENTLEMEN :—Let me pursue this subject in the same calm and dispassionate tone which I have already adopted after your good example.

My object is the same with yours; to carry the election against Gen. Jackson, and to carry it, if we can, by Mr. Clay. But inasmuch as it is admitted on all hands that we cannot carry it at all except by a union of the whole opposition, the question is, on which of the candidates that whole opposition can be probably united.

I have already examined the question with regard to Mr. Clay. He is confessedly the favorite of the National Republicans: but this is the whole of his strength.—It is useless to flatter ourselves with the hope that any other part of the opposition will rally upon him; we cannot but see and know that it is a hope which cannot be realized; it is a conviction so painful that we are unwilling to look at it—we turn our eyes away from it, and satisfy ourselves with saying, “he is the strongest man, and if he cannot defeat General Jackson, nobody else can;” but is this wise? Is it not wiser to look the danger firmly in the face, and to guard ourselves against it if we can? Mr. Clay is not the strongest man if he cannot unite the whole opposition and any one else can; and he may be unable to defeat General Jackson because he cannot unite the whole opposition, while some one else, less splendidly conspicuous than himself, may be able to unite it and thus accomplish what he cannot.

Having seen that it is utterly hopeless to expect a union of the whole opposition on Mr. Clay, let us turn to the other candidates and take up Mr. Calhoun. Here is a gentleman not less dear to his friends than Mr. Clay is to us. That he is a most splendid man every one admits; and that in his address and manners he is one of the most fascinating of the human race no man will deny who ever came within the sphere of his influence.—Can the whole opposition unite upon him? To look no farther than to our own party, we see at once that this is impossible. His peculiar opinions on the great subjects which distinguish our party make it impossible for us to go to him, and thus it is impossible that he can unite the opposition.

Now let us turn to Mr. Wirt. This is a new candidate and with less pretension than either of the others. He is, you say, the weakest of the three, and considered merely with reference to the party which has nominated him, I believe you are right.—But that very weakness may prove his strength, for he has taken no such prominent part in the public measures of the country as to render him obnoxious to any party: while I do not understand that there is any doubt that he agrees with us in his political principles.

On the contrary I see it alleged in our own papers that the Anti-Masons have selected for their candidate “one of the brightest pillars of our own party.” Then *we* cannot object to him on any other ground than that he is not our first choice. But we see that we cannot get our first choice, and shall we refuse to take our second, if the other parts of the opposition will agree to unite upon him? If our principle be, as you allege it to be, that “a pertinacious adherence

to a man is not to be considered as paramount to our duty to our country," and our duty to our country be to displace General Jackson if we can, by a union of the whole opposition, and there be a probability of uniting that whole opposition on Mr. Wirt, is it not our duty to form that union? Then let us examine this probability in relation to Mr. Wirt.

He has already the Anti-Masonic party, who are believed to hold the balance of power in New York, Pennsylvania and Vermont. I do not say that they can command those states by their single vote, but that they hold the balance of power there, and can turn the fate of any election in those states.—It is believed they can do the same in all the other New England states, and it is alleged without contradiction, that their numbers are rapidly increasing. This party Mr. Wirt already has, and we know that they will not go to Mr. Clay. I consider them as having already made an advance to us in the selection of Mr. Wirt. We could wish that they had advanced further and taken Mr. Clay—but in this business of compromise and conciliation we cannot have every thing our own way.

Now suppose that the National Republicans unite upon Mr. Wirt, you perceive that he becomes at once a most powerful candidate, commanding already two great limbs of the opposition. How will he stand with the other members of it.

It is no longer a secret, that the people of the South are so thoroughly disgusted with the course of General Jackson, that they are ready to break off from him if they could find a man on whom they could settle with any consistency and dignity on their own part.



They have heretofore denounced Mr. Clay in terms so bitter and unqualified, that it is out of the question to expect them to come to him. They have no such quarrel with Mr. Wirt: on the contrary, he and Mr. Calhoun are said to have been warm personal friends ever since they joined the administration of Mr. Monroe in 1817, and although Mr. Wirt's politics may not suit them altogether, yet he has not advanced any of those *ultra* doctrines, as they term them, with which they have quarrelled in the case of Mr. Clay. There seems to be no reason to doubt that they would prefer Mr. Wirt to General Jackson, while they have openly declared that if the question be between Mr. Clay and General Jackson, they will adhere to the latter. In confirmation of this view of the subject we must have all remarked, that the leading paper in Mr. Calhoun's interest, the Telegraph, has given the most intelligible indications of Mr. Calhoun's withdrawal from the contest, and of the willingness of that party to come to Mr. Wirt.

We have been told too, that Mr. Wirt has an extensive personal interest in Virginia, where he was and is a great favorite with the illustrious leaders of our party, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and with the great body of the republicans throughout the state; and if it be true that the Jackson party in that state have become so dissatisfied with him that they are ready to fall off as soon as they can find an acceptable leader, though they cannot come to Mr. Clay after the bitter warfare they have so long waged against him, yet there can be no reason to doubt that they will come with alacrity to Mr. Wirt, to whom they are said to be so warmly attached.

Now, if the National Republicans, and the Southern interest will combine on Mr. Wirt, (of which there seems the strongest probability) we shall have the whole opposition united, and General Jackson is defeated, which is the very point at which we are all driving.

You intimate that Mr. Wirt is not a tried and experienced statesman, but remember it is a President we want, and that the best school to form such an officer is the Cabinet of the President. In this Cabinet we must all know that all the great principles of policy and all public measures are discussed in a calm and executive manner, without any of that declamation, which, in Congress, appeals oftener to the passions than the judgment, and in that Presidential School of the Cabinet, Mr. Wirt has served a longer apprenticeship than either of the candidates.—Mr. Clay having served but four years, Mr. Calhoun eight, and Mr. Wirt twelve.—In these Cabinets, too, if I am correctly informed, all the measures on which our party is formed were digested and planned; Mr. Wirt partook in them; and we admit that he is unexceptionable, both as to talents and character. He is not what is called a hackneyed politician; has had nothing to do with political intrigues, and that party bickering of which the country is tired, and, on this account, will be far more acceptable to moderate men of all parties, than either of the other gentlemen.

In short, by uniting on this gentleman, I see a strong and well founded hope of saving the country; whereas by pressing our friend, Mr. Clay, on the single strength of the National Republican party, we in-

fallibly lose both our country and our favorite. Since it is never to be forgotten, as a conceded point, that without the whole opposition in his favor he cannot succeed, and it can be no gratification to him to be run for the purpose of being defeated.

I fear I have been rather tedious in this discussion, but garrulity is the privilege of

AN OLD MAN.

## LETTER III.

GENTLEMEN.—I thank you for the respectful notice you have taken of my communications.—It is only in this calm and temperate way that truth can be discussed with any advantage—Permit me, then, in the same spirit, to resume the discussion to which your comments on my articles seem to invite me.

We agree, that in order to effect this union, all predilections in favor of any candidate ought to be put aside, although that candidate should be the first favorite of our party.

The only question between us, is, on which of the candidates this opposition can be most probably united.

You think that it can be most probably united on Mr. Clay, because he is already very strong, and the other candidates are comparatively very weak.

Now, without disputing your premises, that Mr. Clay is by far the strongest candidate, I must be permitted to doubt your conclusion. It would seem, indeed, that the larger mass ought to be more able to draw to it the smaller masses, than that the smaller should be able to move and attract to them the larger; and so it would be, if these masses were all of the same character. If, for instance, the WHOLE OPPOSITION were composed of National Republicans, it would be most absurd to talk of any other candidate than Mr. Clay. But it happens, unfortunately, that this is not the true state of the case. That large *mass*, called the opposition is not *all* of the same character.

It is divided by characteristic distinctions, which are strongly marked. The different parts stand asunder, repelling each other reciprocally; and it requires some agent to be interposed, to which they may all feel a common attraction, to move them from that state of hostility and bring them together. Now, to prove that Mr. Clay may be best employed as this agent, it is not enough to shew that the largest part of this mass already adheres to him; it must be further shewn that he presents points of attraction to the other parts, or he can never be expected to bring them together. But still worse, if, instead of presenting points of attraction, he presents only points of repulsion, it is manifest, that, instead of bringing the party together, he will only drive them further asunder. And permit me, gentlemen, to ask you in candor, whether this be not the true state of the case? We, who form the larger mass, may deplore it as much as we please, but can we deny the fact? Let us consider the parts of which this opposition is composed, in order to see if what I have stated be not the truth.

1. There is the National Republican party, the larger mass, adhering to Mr. Clay.

2. There is the Southern or Anti-Tariff interest, adhering to Mr. Calhoun. Does Mr. Clay present a single point of attraction to that party? Is he even a NEUTRAL with regard to them? Does he not positively repel them; by the inveterate rivalry between their leaders, by the open denunciation which they have made and continued against Mr. Clay, on account of the part which he took in the election of Mr. Adams, and by the open and deadly quarrel which they maintain with what they call his *ultra* notions on the tariff?

Is it in the nature of things to expect that party to unite on Mr. Clay? It certainly is not. And observe, that this party alone embraces all the states to the south of the Potomac, without the assistance of some of which, it is impossible that Mr. Clay can be elected. The refusal of this single party to unite upon him, would ensure his defeat. But this is not all; for,

3d. There is the Anti-Masonic party, which, it is utterly in vain for us to expect, will ever unite upon Mr. Clay. The hope, I perceive, is given up by the most sanguine of our papers. And, however much we may affect to despise the weakness of this party, we cannot conceal from ourselves the fact, that they hold the balance of power in two of the largest states in the Union, New York and Pennsylvania; that they have, already, the command of Vermont, and that their strength is still in rapid progress in the New-England states generally. Now, whether their strength be positive or negative, it is clear that Mr. Clay cannot take New York or Pennsylvania without them; and, that without these states, all his other strength to the North, will be wholly unavailing.

4. There is another part of the opposition which you have not noticed, but which I deem very important in this calculation. The Jackson party is in a state of dissolution, and very many of its members are ready to fall off the moment they can see an attractive leader in the field. Does Mr. Clay present any such attractions to them? So far from this they are now adhering to their former leader by no other pressure except their antipathy, unfounded and unjust as it is, to Mr. Clay, against whom they have

committed themselves so deeply, that they cannot with any shew of consistency, or even decency, unite upon him.

I do not make a separate head of Judge McLeane's personal friends, though they are known to be very numerous in Ohio and the West, and that they cannot be counted for Mr. Clay.

Now, although it is perfectly true, that the other parts of the opposition cannot make a President without the aid of the National Republicans, yet it is equally obvious, that the National Republicans cannot make a President without the aid of the rest of the opposition.

Of what avail is it then, gentlemen, to make an enumeration of our strength, and of their weakness, if our strength alone be insufficient for our purpose? Of what avail is it to ask them to come to us, because we are the stronger party, while we continue to offer them no other candidate but one who, instead of attracting, manifestly repels them.

They have shewn no disinclination to come to *our party*, though they refuse to come to the particular candidate whom we prefer—I consider the Anti-Masonic nomination of Mr. Wirt, as an advance to our party. They offer us a man of our own party, whom, we ourselves, I understand, are willing to make the Vice President. If they had acted with reference to their own principles alone, I cannot believe they would ever have singled out Mr. Wirt; for they certainly had men of their own party, decidedly more Anti-Masonic than he is, and conspicuous men too, whom it would be easy to name. I have regarded their nomination from the beginning, as an overture to the Na-

tional Republican party for the very purpose of the union at which we are all aiming; and I have very little doubt in my own mind, that the nomination was accepted with the same view—I mean, to afford us the only opportunity for the union which seemed likely to occur.

I do not agree with you, that all the concessions are asked of the National Republican party. For here is at once, a concession by the Anti-Masonic party, to which we have made no return. And if the southern interest should unite on Mr. Wirt, there will be the concession, not only of their favorite candidate, but of the favorite measure on which they have set their hearts; for though they have nothing to dread from any *ultraism* in Mr. Wirt; they cannot but know that he is a National Republican. The grounds of my calculation on that party, in favor of Mr. Wirt, are: 1st. Their manifest determination to break off from General Jackson. 2d. Their despair of carrying Mr. Calhoun. 3d. The personal attachment of this gentleman to Mr. Wirt. 4th. The absence of all offence with Mr. Wirt, who has never alarmed them by the annunciation of what they style *ultra* doctrines, and their confidence in the known moderation of his character, and 5th, the marked indications afforded by the leading Calhoun paper, the *Telegraph* of Washington. Neither of these causes operate to inspire the faintest hope for Mr. Clay; but unfortunately the reverse! while they all conspire to point our attention to Mr. Wirt.

You think that if this gentleman were the only candidate of the opposition, he could not take the states of Louisiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Maryland, or New



Jersey against General Jackson. That is to say, the people of these states would prefer General Jackson to Mr. Wirt. Now, in this I cannot agree with you. Because I understand, you assume, that these states are opposed to General Jackson on the ground of his unfitness for the office which he holds; and if so, I cannot believe them so destitute of patriotism, as to prefer him to a man who seems to be admitted on all hands to be highly fitted for the office, and in whose character there is nothing that is not eminently calculated to attract respect, confidence, attachment and support.

I agree with you entirely in thinking that these states would go for Mr. Clay, with far more ardor than for Mr. Wirt, because they would be impelled by the double motive of hostility to the present incumbent, and well merited attachment to Mr. Clay. But still, if they find that they cannot get Mr. Clay, I believe that their patriotism alone would urge them all to rally on Mr. Wirt (unexceptionable and even desirable as he is admitted on all hands to be) in sufficient force to defeat the re-election of General Jackson. I cannot think otherwise of those states with any respect for their patriotism and consistency.

Do not understand me as disputing the superior claim of Mr. Clay. If my voice could decide this question, Mr. Clay would be our next President — But unfortunately for our wishes, it requires the concurrence of other voices besides our own, to effect the purpose. We cannot reason away the prejudices, however unjust, that oppose an insurmountable barrier to our wishes. We cannot work impossibilities even for the man of our “first love.” That we can.

not elect him without a union of the whole opposition is now admitted on every hand: and I do not perceive that even you, gentlemen, hope for such a union in his favor. *Shall we press him with the certainty of defeat before us?* Or will it not be more wise and patriotic to cast about and see if we cannot find another individual, who with less attractions for us, may yet have more for the other members of the opposition? The idea that if Mr. Clay cannot unite the opposition, no other man can, seems to me to be the very question in dispute. Is this not rather an effusion of feeling than a conclusion of judgment? It seems to me to assume that all tastes are alike, and ours is infallible: an opinion which you will find yourselves obliged to correct, if you live to the age of

AN OLD MAN.

## LETTER IV.

I AM neither surprised nor wounded by the suggestion, that you consider my arguments more plausible than just, because I perceive you have lost sight of the question to which these arguments were directed. The exemplary candour and propriety with which you have treated this subject assure me, that you will take this remark in the same good part in which I receive yours. The question is, on which of the candidates now before us, it will be most practicable to unite the opposition? and in answer to my views of this question, in favor of Mr. Wirt, you say, that unfortunately Mr. Wirt's success is made to depend on that "significant monosyllable '*if*,'—*if* the different members of the opposition will unite upon him. And pray gentlemen, on what does Mr. Clay's success depend? Is it not on that same significant monosyllable; '*if*' the different members will unite upon him?"

You seem to think that you extricate Mr. Clay from this difficulty, by proving that he can be elected without the aid of *the South*. And how do you make out your proof? "*if*" the Anti-Masons will support him, and "*if*" the legislature of Maryland will pass a law, at its next session, to vote by general ticket, so as to give him all the electoral votes of this state. So that your case depends on a double "*if*," the first of which, we know, to be impossible.

It is with no view of retorting your pleasantry, (for I consider it in no unkindler light) that I advert to your suggestions; but for the graver purpose of re-

calling your attention to the true question between us. It is because there is an “*if*” in the case, in relation to *all* the candidates, that any question exists. Shew me that Mr. Clay can be *certainly* elected by the single force of the National Republican party, or, if you admit this to be impossible, shew me a *probability*, (I do not ask a *certainty*) that the other members of the opposition will unite upon him, and I will give up the dispute. Observe, I say, a *probability* that they *will* unite, not an argument to shew they *ought* to unite, for I am convinced of this already. But, unfortunately, this question of union does not depend on *our* opinions nor on that of our party. The other members of the opposition claim the right to think for themselves, and this right cannot be denied to them—I am for *practical results, and that, immediately*. I am for the *union*, because I am for *my country*; compared with which the elevation of any individual, however dear to me, is but dust in the balance. In protracting the unprofitable discussion to convince the other members of the opposition that they *ought* to unite on Mr. Clay, we are wasting the precious hours which should be given to *vigorous and concerted action*. They have told you that they *cannot* and *will not* unite on Mr. Clay, and every argument you urge in support of your proposition is turned upon you by the other parties.

To show the utter hopelessness of this sort of discussion, let me recall your attention to one of your own propositions, with the view of shewing you how it is met. You tell the Anti Masons “that if they resolutely persist in supporting their candidate against hope, it will be apparent that party and not patriotic

motives control them; for it must be manifest to them that if the friends of the other candidates exhibit a like obstinacy, the defeat of Mr. Wirt is inevitable." This is perfectly true. But the Anti-Masons retort your proposition in your own terms and say "If the *National Republicans* resolutely persist in supporting their candidate *against hope*, it will be apparent that party and not political motives control them; for it must be manifest to them that if the friends of the other candidates exhibit a like obstinacy, the defeat of Mr. Clay is inevitable." And can we deny that this is equally true? We cannot deny it, unless we believe that we can elect Mr. Clay by the single strength of the National Republican party, against the opposing strength of General Jackson, the Anti-Masons and the Southern interest, which no man in his senses can believe.

Gentlemen, we *cannot* infuse into the other members of the opposition that strong predilection which we feel for Mr. Clay; and while we continue to insist upon him as our candidate, we place an insurmountable barrier in the way of that union which we all admit to be indispensable to the cause of our country. Every man who is capable of reflection must see this. We may deplore, we do deplore it. We may reproach the Anti-Masons with want of patriotism, because they will not unite on Mr. Clay, they answer that they distinguish between Mr. Clay and their country; they consider it quite as patriotic to support Mr. Wirt as Mr. Clay, and *more patriotic* to extirpate a secret society, inconsistent with the liberties of the country, than to be solicitous for any man. We may call this *fanaticism*, if we please; but we might as

well attempt to persuade *christians* to give up their *religion* and become *deists* or *atheists*, as to persuade the Anti-Masons to give up their opposition to Masonry and unite upon Mr. Clay. I perceive that some of our newspaper editors suppose that it is Mr. Wirt who keeps the Anti-Masons together, and that if he were to *withdraw*, they would dissolve and come in a large body to Mr. Clay. But how preposterous is this? Were they not embodied with unextinguishable zeal *upon their principle* long before Mr. Wirt was thought of? And do they not tell us in their newspapers that *if Mr. Wirt could disgrace himself by such a step*, instead of coming to Mr. Clay, they would only fly the farther from him and his party, and unite, with redoubled zeal, on some other more deep within the bosoms of their own party? It is perfectly idle to expect that any possible contingency can bring that party to Mr. Clay; and there is not a reasonable man in the community who does not perceive, that, without their aid, he cannot be elected.

And where, let me ask you, is the wisdom of shutting our eyes to their strength, or seeking to depreciate it? Look at the recent elections of Pennsylvania. You see that Mr. Clay has no strength in that state. In Philadelphia, counted as his strong hold, he has been defeated by General Jackson, and throughout the rest of the state he has no footing at all. It is divided between General Jackson and the Anti-Masons; the former rapidly going down and the latter as rapidly going up. Then look at New York, the cradle of Anti-Masonry, and where it has already reached to such gigantic stature and strength, that no doubt is expressed of their electing the next Governor. Mr.

Clay has no standing at all in that large and most commanding of all the states in the Union. Vermont has gone over to the Anti-Masons, and the rest of the New-England states are rapidly following her example. And yet, in the face of all these facts, our editors are telling us, that the Anti-Masonic strength has been *greatly overrated*, and *that we can do without them*. Nay, they are insulting them, by stigmatising them as *fanatics*, *noodles*, and many other opprobrious names, as if the object were to drive them off, instead of alluring them to our aid.

And look at the conduct of some of our editors with regard to another quarter of our country — At the very moment we are admitting the necessity of a united exertion of the whole strength of the opposition, to throw off the dead weight that is crushing us all, we had a paragraph in another paper the other day, insinuating, that from the friendship alleged to exist between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Wirt, it was probable that if the latter were elected, the former gentleman and his friends would share much more largely the patronage and favor of the government, than Mr. Clay and his friends. So that at the very moment every true patriot and sensible man in the community, is labouring at the great object of conciliation and union, we have the editors sowing jealousies and distrusts among us, on the sordid and despicable calculation of individual profit and loss. And yet these are the men to whom we look in this country, to exalt the patriotism and morals, and direct the judgment of our people. I can only say, that if I could suppose Mr. Wirt capable of being moved in the discharge of the great duties of this office, by any such poor and pi-

tiful considerations, I had rather "bear the ills we have," than fly to him for succour. But I am not apt to entertain such a suspicion of a man who has reached his time of life with a spotless reputation, and the character universally accorded to him of exalted intellect, and a generous and lofty spirit. It is time for the people of this country to think and act for themselves, instead of being impelled and guided, by those who have no other objects in view than individual office and emolument. And I am happy to observe, for the honor of the press, that the article which has called forth these remarks has been transcribed, I believe, into few of our papers. It is time for us all to rally to the standard of our country, and not to the standard of this or that individual. I am ardently attached to Mr. Clay, but I am still more ardently attached to my country. And whatever pain, the effort may cost me, I, for one, am ready to relinquish him, whenever I see clearly, as I think I now do, that the good of my country calls for the sacrifice. I think the sacrifice now called for, because it is as clear to me as that the sun has risen, that he cannot be elected on that strength, which alone he can command; while I see as clearly, that a re-union of our party on Mr. Wirt will save us.

You object to uniting on this gentleman, because he has been nominated by the Anti-Masons; and you think we cannot support *him*, without admitting ourselves to be Anti-Masons too: and making the success of the Anti-Masonic principle the paramount object of the struggle. I confess, that this objection from such candid men amazes me. Suppose that the Anti-Masons had nominated Mr. Clay for President, and Mr. Wirt for Vice President, would you have seen



any such objection, in that case, to adopting the nomination? Nay, would you not have hailed it with delight, and supported it with acclamation throughout the whole National Republican party? Have you not said so from a hundred presses? And should we not have been right? Of what importance is it from what quarter a nomination comes, provided the nomination be proper in itself, and suited to the exigencies of our case. Is any doubt entertained that Mr. Wirt is a National Republican? It would be idle to affect to raise such a doubt. We all know that he is. We have admitted it by our willingness to make him our Vice President. And what, though he has been nominated by the Anti-Masons? We know that there are many National Republicans among *them*, and can we not support him as *National Republican*, though we be not Anti-Masons? Besides, what Anti-Masonic principle has he advanced, to which we are not all ready, both Masons and Anti-Masons, to subscribe? Have we not ourselves, said that Mr. Clay is as much an Anti-Mason as Mr. Wirt? And if we would have supported Mr. Clay, had *he* been nominated by the Anti-Masons, what consistency is there in making it an objection to Mr. Wirt.

You say that I press, very strongly, the propriety of giving up personal predilection, in relation to Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Clay, but that I strangely abandon it with regard to Mr. Wirt. I answer that I would much more cheerfully abandon it with regard to Mr. Wirt, if I could see the same hope of union on Mr. Clay. It is not individual preference that guides my judgment; if it were, it would carry me to Mr. Clay. But in considering the question of a probability of a

union on either of the candidates, I have regarded those candidates only as I suppose and believe they are regarded by the different members of the opposition, whose union is desired. And thus considering the subject, I see the utter impossibility of a union on either of the former, while there is a strong ground of hope for a union on the latter. It proceeds from no superiority of Mr. Wirt to either of the others; but from the simple fact that there is nothing in him repulsive to any of the members of the opposition, which cannot be affirmed of either of the other gentlemen. I have never considered Mr. Wirt as a *rival candidate* to Mr. Clay; but as a middle ground, a medium of conciliation and union for all the parts of the opposition. We know that he was and is friendly to Mr. Clay as well as to Mr. Calhoun. And if we may believe what is rumoured around us, without contradiction, and what we know to be perfectly congenial with the past pursuits and character of his whole life, he was so far from seeking his present position, that he strove to avoid it, and laboured, by all the means in his power to draw the Anti-Masonic nomination first on Mr. Clay, and this becoming hopeless, on Judge McLean of Ohio, in the hope of bringing about this very union, at which all of us, who are friends of our country, are so zealously labouring. His own nomination, our presses admit, was as perfect a surprise on Mr. Wirt as on the country at large. It was no *personal* nor *Anti-Masonic predilection*, I am convinced, which drew the Anti-Masons to Mr. Wirt. I have never ceased to consider this nomination as an overture directly addressed to us; as an olive branch, held out by the Anti-Masons for the purposes of peace,

conciliation and union, with all the members of the opposition, to accomplish the great common object of dislodging the present incumbent and relieving the country from the reproach and disgrace under which it labours. It was no act of hostility to us. It was one of amity. They say to us, we cannot unite upon Mr. Clay, our principle forbids it; but we offer you another distinguished member of your own party, on whom, not only we, but the South, as we believe, are willing to unite with you; your own political principles are safe with him. His letter satisfies us that, what we understand by anti-masonry is safe with him. And we believe that the South will feel itself far safer in his hands than in those of Gen. Jackson or Mr. Clay.

The question then comes to us, are we willing to unite upon him? Why are we not? This gentleman is a National Republican. He is admitted to be among our most virtuous men, both in public and private life. We ourselves represent him as belonging to the first order of intellect in our own country; a profound and able constitutional lawyer, with a discipline of twelve years in that best of political schools, the Cabinet of the President; a gentleman in his principles, habits and associations; at once dignified and urbane in his manners, and kind, polite and conciliatory in his temper. With all the qualities fitted to shine and prosper in a political course, we see that he has kept himself, from its youth to age, remote from its intrigues, and pure from contaminations, manifestly preferring the enjoyments of private life, to the pomp of a public one, and laboring successfully by all the efforts in his power to raise the moral and literary character of his countrymen. Such is the man who is offered to us *as the only prac-*

*ticable point of union for the members of the opposition.* Shall we alone refuse him ? Shall we close our eyes to the facts which demonstrate the certain and inevitable defeat which is before us if we do refuse him ? Shall we, with some of our editors, talk of nailing the *single flag* of our own party to the mast head, fill all our sails and cheer the ship, while we see that we are running her directly on the rocks ? Shall we do this, when, with the tri-coloured flag which is tendered to us by the other members of the opposition, we have it in our power to keep the open sea and go safely and prosperously into our desired port ? Such *madness* (for it deserves no milder name) may suit young people, but it does not at all accord either with the feelings or judgment of

AN OLD MAN.

## LETTER V.

GENTLEMEN,—You say that I still insist upon the Mountain coming to Mahomet. I was not aware, if pleasantry may be allowed on so grave a subject, that, in addressing the National Republican party, I was addressing an insensible mass of earth and rock. I thought I was speaking to intelligent beings, who had the power of locomotion, and would exert it too, whenever their duty to their country required it.—But since, in the political drama which is in preparation, you insist upon casting the character of the Mountain for our party, permit me to assume, for a moment, that of the prophet, and to foretell that our mountain labors will end where similar labors have ended before, and if we continue to insist on Mr. Clay, *the end is defeat, and that as certain and inevitable as that the election shall arrive.*

It is true that our wise and dignified editors stigmatize every man as an open or insidious foe who presumes to think with independence for himself, and chances to be led to a different conclusion from that which they choose to advocate. I will not give expression to the sentiment which rises to my pen at the contemplation of the state of the press in this country, and the dictatorship over public opinion which these men presume to arrogate; for, I would not increase the spirit of bitterness which is already beginning to mingle itself with this question. My hope is, that the great body of my fellow citizens will keep themselves calm and quiet, and think for themselves with that firmness

and independence which is their right. The design seems to be to frighten us by insult and menace, into a compliance which our reason rejects, and our duty to our country condemns. Others may yield to this slavish terror; for myself, I feel that I am a freeman; and, can look with pity on this impotent attempt to enslave the independence of my judgment.—I turn to you, gentlemen, with pleasure, because, with you, I can sincerely reciprocate the respect with which you continue to receive and treat the views which I am endeavouring, in my feeble, yet unimpassioned way, to lay before you.

I protest against being considered as the advocate of Mr. Wirt. I go for my country, and for the defeat of the re-election of General Jackson. Shew me the competent man who can do this, and you will find me under his banner, whatever may be his name. Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, Judge McLean, Mr. Wirt, Mr. Webster, Mr. John Sergeant, and many others that may be named, would either of them be far more acceptable to me than the present incumbent. I have a preference among them, and that preference, as I have often repeated, is for Mr. Clay. To some of them I should object on political grounds, but I have no objection to either of them which is not far inferior to the insuperable objections I feel to Andrew Jackson. I have considered the subject only with reference to Mr. Clay, Mr. Calhoun, and Mr. Wirt, because these three gentlemen alone are now before the nation, and my own reason operating on that knowledge of parties which is open to us all, has led me to the conclusion which I have endeavoured to support. I do verily and sincerely believe, that, of all the men

in the nation, who have yet been proposed, Mr. Wirt stands in that peculiar position which presents the only chance of accomplishing the purpose at which the whole opposition profess to aim.

You say, I have not yet shown that the whole opposition will unite on Mr. Wirt. It is true there is no *certainty* in the case at present, but I contend that there is a *very strong probability* in his favor. *Shew me such an one with regard to Mr. Clay and I yield the question.* But the misfortune is, that with regard to Mr. Clay, it is *certain* that *they will not* unite. To this *certainty* that *they will not* unite on Mr. Clay, I oppose the *strong probability that they will unite on Mr. Wirt*. And if the National Republican party will unite on him, that probability would become almost a certainty; for then by the union of the National Republican and Anti-Masonic parties, his success would be rendered so far certain, that the wavering materials which are already loosened from the present administration, including the parties of Mr. Calhoun and Mr. M'Lean, would fall off at once and insure the election of Mr. Wirt: whereas if we keep Mr. Clay in the field, these materials will certainly re-unite themselves to General Jackson more firmly, and thus increasing his strength, insure our defeat. It is strange, but true, that the whole difficulty in the case arises from a quarter in which it ought least to be expected, the National Republican party. They cannot and will not give up Mr. Clay; and it cannot be denied that there are those among us who had rather be defeated with Mr. Clay than succeed with any other candidate. This is very amiable in private life, but is it patriotic, is it wise with relation to the greater interests of our coun-

try ? I do not say that this is the case with the whole party, but that it is with many of them I am perfectly convinced. Yet I believe that with many others, and indeed the far greater number of our party, the prevailing argument and belief is, that there is no hope of success but in Mr. Clay, and that if we cannot defeat General Jackson with him, we have no chance of doing it with any other candidate.

It is against this proposition that I have directed my efforts. I do not believe it to be sound. On the contrary, I think it demonstratively certain that we cannot succeed with Mr. Clay, unless we retract the concession heretofore universally made, that it requires a union of the opposition to insure our success. While I do believe such a union may be formed on Mr. Wirt, I do not perceive that even you gentlemen have the slightest hope of such a union on Mr. Clay ; and if so, is it not manifest that in hoping for his success we are hoping against reason ? The proposition, therefore, that if we cannot succeed with Mr. Clay, we cannot succeed with any other candidate, amounts to an abandonment of the contest, so far as a successful result is concerned. And are we to set down for another four years under the yoke of Andrew Jackson ?—We shall unquestionably do it, if we rest on Mr. Clay. I am therefore prepared to look out for a man by whose instrumentality we can save ourselves from this fate ; and if we have not yet found that man, I am prepared to look further until we do find him.

But what are the grounds on which this desperate proposition is maintained, that if we cannot succeed with Mr. Clay, we cannot succeed with any one else ? I understand them to be these : that Mr. Clay has al-



ready the support of the strongest member of the opposition, the National Republican party, and that this party will not give him up and unite on any other candidate. But it is clear and is admitted that on this party alone, which constitutes his whole strength, Mr. Clay cannot succeed ; and if with this certainty of defeat before them, the National Republicans will not give him up, it is equally clear that present success is not their object. They may gratify their own feelings for the present, and may also gratify Mr. Clay for the present, by this evidence of their attachment to him, and after the battle is fought and lost they may have the further gratification of saying to him, “ well, we stuck to you to the last—we cannot help it ;” and he may have the pleasure to rejoin “ I thank you my friends for this evidence of your devotion, which is efficacious enough to sweeten the bitterness of defeat, &c. &c.” In the mean time, while this sentimental dialogue is going on, what has become of the country ? Andrew Jackson is re-elected, and the country is to be degraded and cursed for another four years, for the sake of this interchange of sentiment between our party and Mr. Clay. I hope I am as sensible of the value of kind and friendly feelings both in private and public life, as the rest of my fellow-citizens, but I do not understand the propriety of permitting those feelings to take the lead of our judgments, when a great measure of vital importance to our country is concerned.

I am fully aware of the strong attachment of the National Republican party to Mr. Clay. I know that there is more *eclat* connected with his name, than that of any other candidate. I know how ardently our party desire his election, and with what extreme

reluctance they would give him up. But when we see that he *cannot possibly be elected*, what reason, what patriotism, what grace is there in persisting in exposing him and ourselves to certain defeat, while our prostrate country is calling to us for relief? Ought not this reflection to bring us to a pause? Is it not wiser to look around us and see if there be no possibility of affording to our country the relief which is asked and which we all see she much needs? The National Republicans wish the election of Mr. Clay, but surely they do not wish his defeat. And do we not all admit that our first duty is to our country, and that to enable us to minister to her wants and to her glory, all our personal predilections ought to give way? Now, if the National Republicans see, as they must see, that they cannot carry Mr. Clay, and see also by uniting on another member of their own party, that they can carry relief to their suffering country, shall we believe them so unpatriotic as to say that they will not unite upon him, but will still adhere to Mr. Clay though his case be one of total despair. I cannot yet believe this. Though our party may have the size of the mountain, I do not believe they have its stolidity and immobility. I believe they can and will move in whatever direction their duty to their country calls them.

Some of our papers allege that it would destroy the organization of the National Republican party to unite with the other members of the opposition on Mr. Wirt. But would not the same visionary objection (for such I shall shew it to be) exist to their uniting with the opposition on any other candidate on whom there is the slightest hope that they can be brought to unite. This is manifestly so; and the objection re-

solves itself into an objection to any union at all, unless the other members will follow your dictation in uniting on Mr. Clay, which you know they will not do. Then, these editors wilfully reject the aid of the other members of the opposition, and assent to what they cannot but know must be the certain consequence, the re-election of General Jackson. And why is this disastrous consequence to be forced upon us? We are told that it is to preserve the *organization* of the National Republican party; but to what purpose? certainly with no purpose connected with the approaching election, for this is manifestly desperate if the National Republicans stand alone in the contest. It must then be with reference to the election of 1836. For whose good? For Mr. Clay's, I suppose. Now, what may happen between this time and 1836,—on what policy the nation may have finally settled down, in the strong desire to conciliate the South and the North, and thus preserve the union of the United States,—whether the South may not before *that time* even have separated from the union,—and who may be alive to witness these changes, who can tell? Mr. Clay, you and I may all be in our graves. And are we in the mean time, to submit to the present evil, which is now grinding and crushing our country, and continue to bow our necks to this modern Domitian who is lording it over our liberties, our honor, our morals, on the precarious contingencies of what may happen in 1836? Is this prudent, is it wise, is it patriotic? we have it, now, in our power to disencumber our country of a grievous and disgraceful burthen; and instead of doing it, directly, with the energy of patriots, we fold our arms and permit the nuisance to

continue, and content ourselves with dreaming and talking of what may *possibly* be done in 1836.

And all this we are told we are to suffer to preserve the *organization* of the National Republican party. I should be glad to understand what is meant by the *organization* of our party; since it is this *organization* which is said to be in danger by our accepting the invitation of the other members of the opposition to unite with them in overthrowing the present dynasty. I understand the usual meaning of the *organization* of a body both in its physical and political sense; but am not aware that the National Republican party of the United States is an organized body in either of these senses. I know of no bond of union between the members of this party, but their concurrence in opinion on the great questions of public policy. It is this concurrence of opinion that constitutes the only organization of the party with which I am acquainted: and I confess myself utterly unable to comprehend how their supporting, for the office in question, the nomination of a man who belongs to their own party, can have the slightest tendency to affect their *organization* as the National Republican party. Do those editors mean to say that having Mr. Clay for their head, constitutes the *organization* of the party, and that if you give up *him* you give up your *party*? If they do, then it is no longer a party of *principle*, it is the party of a *man*; and the death of Mr. Clay would put an end to your opinions and your party. In this sense of the word, I beg you to understand that I am not a National Republican, for I can be no man's vassal. I feel that I am not born to lick the dust from the foot of any man, however high accidental circum-

stances or his own merits may have raised him. I stand upon the *principles* of the National Republican party, and I believe that these *principles* will survive us all; nor do I feel them at all endangered by my supporting a man whom I believe to be as truly and firmly a National Republican as Mr. Clay himself.

Nor can I imagine how my political principles are to be lost or even weakened by the other members of the opposition uniting on this man. I support him as a National Republican. I care not for the motives which lead others to support him. If the National Republican party adopt him, he becomes the candidate of the party; and if there is to be any merging in the case, it is far more natural to suppose that the minor members of the party will be merged in the larger, than the reverse. But in truth there is no necessity for the merging of any party by this joint operation. Did the several colonies of the United States lose their separate characters because they united their arms to repel the encroachments of Great Britain? Were they not, after their victory, still separate states standing upon their several and respective constitutions?

No, gentlemen, our party is formed and known by their principles. It is this alone which distinguishes them from other parties. It is this, that constitutes *their only organization*. And let the election fall on whom it may, their principles and the party which hold them, will still live and flourish, for they are vitally connected with the firmness and felicity of the union. The idea that our party will lose its *organization* by uniting on a man holding the same principles with ourselves, is a vision so wild and strange as to be

utterly incredible and unintelligible to me; and with too many, I much fear, that it is merely a mask to cover the settled determination, rather to be defeated at this time with Mr. Clay, than to succeed with any other man.

I have yet something more to say, for the cause is near my heart; I do not love my country less for being

AN OLD MAN.

## LETTER VI.

You still think, that it is out of the question to expect the National Republican party to unite on Mr. Wirt. Then let us give up Mr. Wirt, and look for some one else on whom they *will* unite, with the other members of the opposition. Will they unite on Mr. Calhoun, or Mr. McLean, or Mr. Webster, or Mr. Sergeant? None of these gentlemen, I believe, are Masons, some of them are National Republicans, and it is possible, that if we consent, the other members of the opposition may be willing to unite on some one of them, and thus carry the great object so near to our hearts.

Permit me to offer to your consideration, another suggestion. Congress will soon be in session, and there, I understand, will be found gentlemen belonging to the several divisions of the opposition. Let them enter into a conference with each other, and see if it be not possible to find a remedy for our country's griefs. Let them meet in a spirit of mutual conciliation, and unite their patriotic exertions to heave off the incubus, which is oppressing and destroying our country. I care nothing for the elevation of Mr. Wirt or of any other individual, in comparison with the honor and salvation of the republic. I believe him to be an honest man, and as such I respect him. He has told us that he does not desire the office, and I believe him, for I do not think that ambition is the god of every man. But whether he desires the office or not, is a consideration which would not weigh a

feather in my judgment. Let the members of Congress confer, and indicate to their respective parties, the man, on whom the opposition can be wholly united; or if not wholly, can be so far united as to defeat the re-election of Andrew Jackson; and that man, if I think him honest and competent, as no doubt I shall, will thenceforth become my candidate. If that man should not be **Mr. Wirt**, let those who have placed him in nomination withdraw him, for I will not ask of him any thing so manifestly improper and unavailing, as to withdraw himself. Let all others be put aside except the candidate so nominated, and let us all make "a long pull, a strong pull, and a pull altogether," to lift up the down trodden honor of our country, and restore it to its former elevation.

You will ask me, if I am not willing to trust the National Republican Convention to make the nomination? I answer, that I am perfectly willing, if that Convention can speak for the other members of the opposition, whose union is admitted to be indispensable to our success. That Convention, so far as I have seen their names, is composed of gentlemen of the first character, both for talents, honor, and patriotism. Do they come from all the various members of the opposition, so far as to give us an assurance of the union of those members on their nomination? But even if they do not, yet as their session will be contemporaneous with that of Congress, and as in Congress there are members, we are told, from all the various divisions of the opposition, it will be easy for the Convention sitting as they will, in the same neighbourhood with Congress, to ascertain the practicability of uniting the opposition in whole or in part, on



some one candidate, so as to guide their own decision to a successful result.

If they *will not* do this, if they *will not even consult* with the other members of the opposition; if they are to meet, as I have seen it suggested in one of our headlong papers, *for the single and express purpose of nominating Mr. Clay and no one else*, then, gentlemen, flatter ourselves as we may, the case is gone, and we are ingloriously defeated, leaving the neck of our country under the foot of Andrew Jackson, and his myrmidons laughing in triumph at our obstinacy and folly.

You say that if no other member of the opposition will unite on Mr. Clay, yet the National Republicans alone, although they may not be able to elect him before the people, will be able to carry him into the house *the leading member*. And do you think it advisable to run this risk, if, by uniting the opposition, you can secure an election by the people? Will you persist in believing that the opposition cannot be united, without stopping to make a trial, or even consulting for the purpose of a trial? Is it desirable, think you, to have another election by the House of Representatives after the experience we have already had on this subject? Are you so very sure that Mr. Clay will get before the house at all? I do not believe he will, but that the very division and distraction of the opposition, with which we are threatening ourselves, will insure the re-election of General Jackson. But, suppose Mr. Clay to get before the house: have you examined the materials of which that house is to be composed? Have you polled the members, and can you rationally entertain the hope that before

that house, Mr. Clay will be elected? Will not all Gen Jackson's friends stand fast to *him*? Will not the Southern interest prefer *him* to Mr. *Clay*? Shall we shut our eyes to these facts too, and rush as blindly before the house, as we are now rushing before the people, with every calculation against us, nay with the certainty of defeat before us in both instances? We accuse the other members of the opposition of a want of patriotism, and even of a conspiracy to re-elect Gen. Jackson.—Why? Because they will not bow to our dictation, as to the candidate to be supported. What right have we to dictate. We are only one member of an opposition composed of several members, each of which has the same right with ourselves. The other members of the opposition say they cannot unite on Mr. Clay! but they have given the most intelligible demonstrations that they are willing to unite on another man of our own party, with whom we must know our political principles to be safe, or we never would have been willing to make him our Vice-President.—If *we alone* continue to refuse this union, on whom does the charge fall of a want of patriotism, and a conspiracy to re-elect Gen. Jackson? Gentlemen, the question of union or no union, depends on our party. The fate of the election is in our own hands. If it be lost, let us declare and argue as we may, every considerate man will see that the responsibility is on us.

Our enemy sees our folly, and is laboring, by all the arts in his power, to keep Mr. Clay in the field. Thus the other day, the Jackson paper, the Globe, cunningly threw out the suggestion, that they would consider the withdrawal of Mr. Clay as the withdrawal of all

opposition to the re-election of Gen. Jackson. Instead of seeing through this shallow artifice to keep Mr. Clay in the field, for such it is, our profound and sapient editors are every where gravely thanking the Globe for his salutary admonitions, and assuring him that we have no intention of committing such a folly, while the Globe and his compeers are laughing behind the curtain, at the ridiculous facility with which we suffer ourselves to be gulled. What phrenzy has seized us ;—what fatal necessity is urging us to our ruin ? It would really seem as if, according to the sentiment of the Roman writer, “ Heaven, determined upon our destruction, had first made us mad.”

Gentlemen, I have done. You may call this croaking, if you please, and your brother editors may, if they think proper, continue to treat it as insidious hostility to Mr. Clay. But, if things take the course now indicated by our public papers, the time will come, and that ere long, when you will think more favorably than you now seem to do, of the counsels of

AN OLD MAN.













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